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Monopolistic Competition, Auction and 
Authorization. A Schumpeterian View of  
Leadership and the Political Market 
András Körösényi  
Abstract: »Monopolistische Konkurrenz, Auktion und Autorisierung. Eine 
Schumpetersche Analyse«. The market analogy of democracy played a central 
role in one of the leading versions of democratic theory in the last fifty years, 
in the so-called “elite” or “competitive” theory of democracy. In the present 
paper, I first clarify that the dominant school of the market analogy (Downs 
and his followers) turned its back on the approach of the originator of the anal-
ogy, Joseph Schumpeter. Schumpeter argued that both economic and political 
competition – due to the activity of entrepreneurs – are necessarily monopolis-
tic and destroy equilibrium. Second, I show how followers of the Schumpete-
rian market analogy improved upon it by using the concept of natural monopo-
lies and making it conform to the characteristics of politics, while further 
distancing themselves from Downsian interpretation and the dominant Public 
Choice approach. Finally, I demonstrate a normative implication of monopolis-
tic competition, namely its consequences for the concept of “agency loss”. 
Keywords: democracy, market analogy, monopolistic competition, authoriza-
tion, Schumpeter. 
Introduction 
The concept of democratic elitism appeared in the Post-Second World War 
period. It aimed at reconciling the elite perspective with democracy and be-
came a dominant paradigm of democratic theory (Dahl 1956; Downs 1957; 
Sartori 1987; Schumpeter 1987). The reconciliation reflected the obvious fact 
that in modern democracies elected leaders and elites rule, but they are con-
strained in their rule and can be ousted by the voters. Rival elite teams compete 
for votes and power, and the electorates can choose who is authorized to gov-
ern. After the re-emergence of radical and participatory democratic theory in 
the 1960’s and 1970’s (Bachrach 1967; Pateman 1970), a new elite paradigm 
has been presented by John Higley and his collaborators (e.g., Field and Higley 
1980; Higley and Burton 2006; Best and Higley 2010). The novelty of the new 
elite paradigm was threefold. First, unlike Schumpeter and other authors of 
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democratic elitism, Higley and his collaborators formulated the social and 
political (elite) preconditions of stable liberal democratic regimes. Second, they 
revived the classical elitist tradition by switching their attention from political 
leaders to broader elite groups. In this new elite paradigm, three types of elite 
structures – ideological unity, disunity and consensual unity – are distinguished 
and treated as determinants of different regime types. Third, Higley and his 
colleagues widened their approach beyond the narrow focus of Schumpeter 
(1987), Downs (1957), and Dahl and Lindblom (1953). Unlike these authors, 
they pointed to an underlying ruling consensus (norms of competition) binding 
together elites “running” all democratic regimes. This elite consensus was 
regarded as a precondition of stable representative and liberal democracy. In 
this essay, which is a tribute to Higley’s seminal work, I return to the “eco-
nomic” approach reflected in the Schumpeterian version of democratic elitism. 
My aim is to demonstrate that, even if there is an underlying elite consensus, 
the nature of the competition ensures that democratic elitism is more “elitist” 
than it is often assumed. 
The Novelty of Schumpeter’s Approach 
Joseph Schumpeter is widely considered the father of competitive theory of 
democracy that combines economic and political analyses and relies on the 
market analogy of democracy. However, later advocates of the economic-
competitive theory of democracy (Downs 1957), as well as Public Choice 
theorists, took a sharp turn away from Schumpeter’s approach, which was 
largely ignored by macro-economists, political scientists and democratic theo-
rists.1 Following the work of Anthony Downs, the dominant approach in these 
fields became one based on neoclassical economics and politics – against 
which Schumpeter had fought his whole life. Downs’ theory is the political 
science equivalent of the neoclassical model of market economy. As David 
Miller pointed out in his classic article (1983), and as argued in more detail 
elsewhere (Pakulski and Körösényi 2012), Downs’ model fundamentally dif-
fers from Schumpeter’s approach. Schumpeter’s theory of economic develop-
ment and democracy is radically opposed to neoclassical economics and to the 
classical theory of democracy, as well as to Public Choice theory (from now on 
I will refer to the amalgam of the two as “the neoclassical approach”). 
The difference between Schumpeter’s analysis and the neoclassical ap-
proach is stark. While in the neoclassical approach the (political) market is 
characterized by perfect competition, and as a consequence by market equilib-
rium – which also means reaching a social-welfare optimum – the work of 
Schumpeter aims at questioning the notions of balance and equilibrium. In his 
                                                             
1  For an explanation of this neglect, see Best and Higley (2010, 4-5) and Higley (2010). 
 59
theory of economic development, Schumpeter refutes the analytic and norma-
tive theory of perfect competition. He shows that competition inevitably 
evolves into a monopolistic and/or oligopolistic form as a consequence of 
innovation and entrepreneurship – the major dynamic forces in both the eco-
nomic and political realm. In Schumpeter’s procedural-realistic theory of de-
mocracy, political leaders (entrepreneurs) play the role of innovators, similar to 
charismatic leaders in Weber’s theoretical accounts. Moreover, Schumpeter 
warns readers against treating economic and political conduct as equal, and 
points to the limits of the market analogy. In political competition oligopolis-
tic/monopolistic tendencies are much stronger than in the economy. The social 
usefulness of political innovation is often in doubt, and the manipulation of 
citizens’ political preferences and demands is also more pronounced than in the 
case of the economic proceedings. This clearly indicates that the popular inter-
pretation of Schumpeter’s theory as a simple extension of economics and an 
exploration of the “market analogy” has to be treated with scepticism.  
The aims in this paper2 are, first, to show that Schumpeter’s approach differs 
radically from that of “economic” followers of the market analogy, with whom 
his theory is often – but wrongly – conflated; and second, to show how follow-
ers of the Schumpeterian tradition improved on it by using the concepts of 
natural monopolies and monopolistic competition. These improvements also 
distanced Schumpeter’s theory further from Downsian interpretations, on the 
one hand, and from the dominant Public Choice approach on the other. There is 
also a third, slightly less central aim: to highlight some analytic and normative 
implications of the Schumpeterian theory, especially his claims on the monopo-
listic nature of political competition. I will argue that the right use of the mar-
ket analogy puts several aspects of democracy in a new light. From the Schum-
peterian viewpoint, democracy can be approximated to a monopolistic 
competition, where the democratic electoral contest compares to franchise 
bidding for natural monopolies, and where the election winner is the highest 
bidder who gets authorization (a free mandate) to govern (cf. Pakulski and 
Körösényi 2012).  
The argument is presented in five steps. In the first part, I comment on the 
originality of Schumpeter’s approach as opposed to the dominant equilibrium 
theory, with particular emphasis on the median voter model, which is dominant 
in contemporary political science. In a second step, I analyze the monopolistic 
character of the political market, as portrayed by Schumpeter, and comment on 
the barriers to competition. In the third part, I supplement the analysis with 
Gordon Tullock’s theory of the auction-type market of natural monopolies, 
which significantly improves the Schumpeterian approach. In a fourth step, I 
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analyse the effects of the monopolistic character of the political market and its 
impact on the functioning of democracy. Finally, I touch upon an important 
normative implication of monopolistic competition.  
The Market Analogy of Democracy 
Schumpeter’s view of democracy parallels his theory of economic develop-
ment, but there are clear differences between Schumpeter’s theory of demo-
cratic competition and his later economic theory of democracy. These differ-
ences concern the equilibrium model, the theory of innovation and economic 
development, the role of the entrepreneur, and the status of monopolistic com-
petition. While Downs clearly relies on an equilibrium model of democratic 
behaviour, Schumpeter rejects it. In his famous early work, The Theory of 
Economic Development (1959/1911) he set forth the idea, still relevant today, 
that qualitative change, or development, has a strong disequilibrating effect. In 
the static equilibrium model of neoclassical economics, change can only be 
interpreted as quantitative growth or decline, caused by external (exogenous) 
factors; therefore a state of equilibrium is incompatible with development. 
Schumpeter’s view is that a state of equilibrium excludes the appearance of 
new kinds of products or goods, as well as new political viewpoints, problems 
or policy solutions. Such innovations disrupt the equilibrium, so that public 
good can no longer be identified with the state of equilibrium or with the politi-
cal preferences of any “median voter”.  
This implies a specific view of development. In the neoclassical model of 
the market economy, and in the Downs’ model of the median voter, there is no 
qualitative development, only quantitative change, caused by external factors. 
As Schumpeter explains, in the neoclassical model “economic life is essentially 
passive and merely adapts to the natural and social influences which may be 
acting on it” (1989, 159). Such quantitative change may be, for example, the 
rise in the price of a raw material, or an increase in the labour-supply in eco-
nomics, and a change in voter preferences in politics. The equilibrium model 
shows how this effects a change in production, or in party (government) policy. 
By contrast, Schumpeter emphasizes the inner workings of development by 
qualitative change, by innovation, which implies the creation of something 
new, hitherto untried. Innovations, are defined by Schumpeter (1989, 138) as 
“changes in production functions which cannot be decomposed into infinitesi-
mal steps. Add as many mail-coaches as you please, you will never get a rail-
road by doing so.” “What we, unscientifically, call economic progress means 
essentially putting productive resources to uses hitherto untried in practice, and 
withdrawing them from the uses they have served so far. This is what we call 
‘innovation’,” he explains (1989, 63-4).  
The claim that brings Schumpeter close to democratic elitism is that entre-
preneurs are agents of development and innovation (Best and Higley 2010, 3). 
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Entrepreneurial innovation, therefore, constitutes an endogenous explanation 
for development. The appearance of innovation, however, is neither natural, 
nor accidental: it is the result of conscious individual ambition and effort, 
which are the most important elements of entrepreneurial activity. Entrepre-
neurs, like Weber’s charismatic leaders, are extraordinary people, who are not 
content with tried methods and past experience but create something new, or 
operate in a new way.3 They do not merely react or respond to an outside de-
mand; the demand and the impulse for change generated by the innovation are 
created by them (Schumpeter 1989, 27). 
Why are entrepreneurs exceptional? Because “outside routine most people 
find it difficult and are often unable to act; those who can are rare and therefore 
not subject to competitive conditions, whence the phenomenon of profit” 
(Schumpeter 1989, 33).4 An entrepreneur believes that “he is right, while eve-
ryone else is wrong” and sees an opportunity for profit in his superior percep-
tion (Loasby 1984, 79). Others can copy their behaviour later, after new things 
have been successfully done: and innovation spreads through industries by this 
copying. The same argument is applicable to the political market, although 
Schumpeter himself does not elaborate the details of this analogy in his Capi-
talism, Socialism and Democracy (1987).  
Innovative behaviour and the function of entrepreneurs are distinct from 
routine behaviour and the mere “managerial” function that fits the equilibrium 
model. While traditional businessmen, managers and politicians react to exist-
ing demands for their standardized products, entrepreneurial activity “creates 
an expansion of demand for its own” – for its new products. The equilibrium 
model (both in economics and in political theory) narrows its focus to mere 
adaptation, which drives the process back to equilibrium. Equilibrium analysis, 
therefore, assumes adjustments to demands carried out by traditional business-
men or managers in the economy and by politicians in the electoral market. 
There is no room for the entrepreneur in such analysis. 
The fourth element of Schumpeter’s theory is the theory of monopolistic or 
oligopolistic competition. Both the neoclassical theory of economics and the 
median voter model of politics take perfect competition as a superior condition 
of the market. However, in Schumpeter’s view, innovation and entrepreneurial 
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activity destroy perfect competition and create monopolistic positions in the 
market (1987, 132) and it is precisely perfect competition, a widely celebrated 
feature of the market in (neo) classical economics, that is incompatible with 
development understood as entrepreneur-driven innovation. His explanation is 
that free entry into the market and unrestrained competition would eliminate 
the profit of entrepreneurial activity and destroy the motive for innovation and 
progress.5 Therefore, from the perspective of progress and development, “per-
fect competition is not only impossible, but inferior” (1987, 106). The emer-
gence of oligopolies and cartels, as well as oligopolistic party systems, are not 
deficiencies of the market and politics, but inevitable consequences of competi-
tion and the innovative activity of entrepreneurs and political leaders. 
From all this, we could assume that a Schumpeterian account of political in-
novation undermines perfect competition and the equilibrium model of politics. 
What is really Schumpeterian in this respect, however, is to acknowledge that 
leadership (innovation) and perfect competition are incompatible, and that the 
principle of “the more competition, the more efficient working of the market” 
is not valid beyond a certain point. True, entry barriers for outsiders and the 
lack of competition might mean a monopolistic position for a single political 
actor, and a long-lasting monopoly might have a negative impact on innovation 
and “progress,” but too much, particularly unrestrained competition can also 
have a disastrous effect: it can destroy oligopolies, destabilize the political 
process and weaken the motivation of strong/large political actors (parties) for 
innovation. To sum up, the idea of perfect competition is undermined in a 
Schumpeterian account by the oligopolistic nature of leadership contest and 
party competition in democratic politics (Santoro 1993). 
The Limits of the Market Analogy 
The explanatory power of the market analogy has its limits. While Schumpeter 
introduces the market analogy to his analysis of politics, he also emphasizes 
some differences between the two. In short, there are stronger monopolistic 
elements in the political market than in the economic one. This point needs 
further elaboration. 
First, the political market (electoral competition) is not an ongoing process. 
Unlike in the consumer market, there is no permanent feedback from citizens 
(political consumers); feedback works only at the distinct intervals of regular 
elections (cf. 1987, 263). Moreover, in the economy, producers’ innovations 
are subject to “checks” and “falsifications” by consumers. People can buy and 
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taste a new line of products, and having had this experience, they may abandon 
innovations and return to their regular brand. In politics, by contrast, citizens 
must vote for a candidate who promises a new policy without any chance to 
having an experience of its effects, and after electing her/him, they do not have 
the freedom to return to their earlier choice. Thus, in the political sphere, there 
is no direct opportunity for falsification, as Loasby notes (1984, 80). 
Second, in politics the leaders set the agenda and manipulate the issues. 
“The ways in which issues and the popular will on any issue are being manu-
factured is exactly analogous to the ways of commercial advertising,” argues 
Schumpeter (1987, 263). Moreover, advertising is more suitable for manipula-
tion in politics than in the economy, since citizens, unlike consumers, do not 
have the possibility of changing their choice after a bad experience. The differ-
ence in the nature of private and political goods makes political advertising 
more efficient and strengthens the ability of politicians to manufacture the will 
of the people.  
The picture of the prettiest girl that ever lived will in the long run prove pow-
erless to maintain the sales of a bad cigarette. There is no equally effective 
safeguard in the case of political decisions. Many decisions of fateful impor-
tance are of a nature that makes it impossible for the public to experiment with 
them at its leisure and at moderate cost, 
suggests Schumpeter (1987, 263). In addition, citizens’ political competence is 
weaker than consumers’ competence. One of the sources of Schumpeter’s top-
down depiction of democratic politics, contained in his famous infantilism 
argument, is psychological.6 Here the constraints lie in the differences between 
consumers’ and voters’ capacity for autonomous choice: there is more room for 
the manipulation of citizens’ preferences than for the manipulation of consum-
ers’ choice. 
Third, there is no real electoral control over public policy. This policy is 
formulated by politicians and governmental experts and then presented to the 
public, often with a heavy dose of persuasion. The function of elections is to 
produce (or evict) a government and citizens have only a limited and passive 
role in this process. The “acceptance of leadership is the true function of the 
electorate’s vote” Schumpeter writes (1987, 273). 
Fourth, elections mean, principally, the self-selection of leaders by obtaining 
public acceptance (votes). Schumpeterian democracy therefore means an open 
competition for leadership. Entrepreneurs of the market economy are not 
“elected” by consumers, they appear on the scene by their own efforts, supply-
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for political leaders. Politics is the sphere of politicians’ everyday activity, where they are 
familiar with the rules, conventions and other realities of life (1987, 258-61). 
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ing new products, etc. (self-selection). They have to “sell” their new products 
to consumers. This is similar in democratic politics where (elected) political 
leaders have to defeat their rivals first within the party in order to become the 
official electoral candidate. But Schumpeter is aware of the danger of negative 
selection in politics and warns of “the problem of the quality of the men the 
democratic method selects for positions of leadership” (1987, 288). He also 
emphasizes that governing needs different abilities to winning elections: “the 
democratic method creates professional politicians whom it turns into amateur 
administrators and ‘statesmen’” (1987, 288). 
Fifth, there is, a monopolistic tendency in every competition (Schumpeter 
1987, 79), though the monopolistic features in politics are stronger than in the 
economy. We can say that in the circular flow of the economic process you can 
be, but you do not have to be, an entrepreneur. To be an entrepreneur is some-
thing special and rare. You can prosper by being a mere businessman or politi-
cian, by behaving in a routine way and according to your past experience and 
customs. In politics, however, there is a stronger pressure to innovate, to invent 
“new combinations”, since the nature of rivalry is different. In politics incum-
bency is a natural monopoly, so that losers are strongly motivated to introduce 
an innovation in order to defeat the incumbent. Politics necessarily becomes a 
zero-sum game or a struggle for power (in the Weberian sense). 
Sixth, even democratic government might be authoritarian. Schumpeter’s 
procedural definition of democracy excludes many ways of securing leadership 
(e.g. military insurrection), but  
it does not exclude the cases that are strikingly analogous to the economic 
phenomena we label “unfair” or “fraudulent” competition or restraint of com-
petition … (t)here is a continuous range of variation within which the demo-
cratic method of government shades off into the autocratic one by impercepti-
ble steps (1987, 271).  
This means that the electoral market is not only necessarily constrained and 
monopolistic, but that the deterioration of the quality of competition may trans-
form the nature of government to be an even more autocratic one under the 
democratic method. 
Tullock’s Model of Democracy:  
Auction Market of Monopolistic Goods 
As we have seen, Schumpeter also highlighted some differences between eco-
nomic and political competition, and emphasized the limits of the market anal-
ogy of democracy. The dichotomy of the virtues and limits of the market anal-
ogy was also a focus of Gordon Tullock’s work in the field of political 
economy. According to Tullock (1965), the competition among parties and/or 
candidates, and the democratic electoral process bears little resemblance to 
ongoing market processes. Rather he sees its structure as being very similar to 
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auction markets of monopolistic goods; an insight that is used subsequently for 
the development of further arguments by Tullock, and later Demsetz 
(1968/1989). Tullock’s basic idea has three major elements (cf. Wohlgemuth 
2000, 277). First, we have to view government as a natural monopoly – in a 
democracy (nor any other kind of regime) there cannot be more than one gov-
ernment or legal system in existence at the same time. Neither can be more 
than one majority in the legislature on any given issue. Second, the license to 
operate this political monopoly can be won at periodically held auctions, that 
is, in a competition that serves as a barrier to the abuse of the right to govern. 
And third, the proper functioning of the auction market depends, among other 
things, on the threshold of entering the competition. 
Tullock’s analogy solves the paradox of the coexistence of elements of 
competition and monopoly. The winner of the competition wins the right to 
operate the monopoly for a predetermined length of time (the term of the li-
cense) – after that they have to compete again against other bidders for a re-
newal of the license. Tullock recognized that this model also gives a good 
description of the democratic competition for government power. The main 
characteristic of the structure of the political market being that, while there is 
competition for governmental power7, for incumbents of governmental power8 
there is a monopoly instead of competition. Indeed, incumbency means the 
exclusion of all other competitors: there can be no competition in the act of 
governing and, as with natural monopolies, there are no rival political “produc-
ers”. This is because, within a state, political consumers cannot choose among 
alternative public goods any more than city residents can choose among rival 
water companies that supply them with running water. 
While at traditional auctions the highest bidder is the winner, in the auction 
market of monopolistic goods the winner will be either whoever pays the high-
est license fee for a monopoly, or whoever charges the lowest fee for a prede-
termined set of services or for performing a certain activity (e.g. supplying 
electricity for a city, or running a senior citizens’ home). Tullock, then Dem-
setz, and other authors in the field of political economy and the new institu-
tional economics, modelled democratic competition on the second analogy, 
whereby political entrepreneurs competing for government power are also 
bidding to run the government for a certain fee (e.g. at a certain level of taxa-
tion). 
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8  That is, “within the field” (ibid). 
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Contractual Disabilities 
While Tullock’s franchise-bidding analogy grasps the characteristics of politi-
cal competition better than anything before, it is not unproblematic. Its difficul-
ties stem from some fundamental differences between politics and the econ-
omy. Viewing incumbency as a natural monopoly and describing democratic 
competition as an auction market of monopolistic goods highlights many fea-
tures of democratic politics that would otherwise remain hidden. However, 
Williamson (1976) and Goldberg (1976) point out that the license fee for in-
cumbency cannot simply be determined by the auctioning of traditional market 
goods – and this gives rise to several problems. Williamson writes about the 
possibility of serious contractual disabilities among conditions of a lack of 
information and future risks, such as the uncertainty of award criteria, incom-
plete contract, and entry barriers. It is worth pausing for the moment to look at 
these problems in a way that Wohlgemuth (2000, 278-84) suggests, namely, by 
seeing the “auction process” as comprising three consecutive steps: first, the 
competition of the bids, second, setting the criteria for winner selection, and 
finally, looking at the nature of the contract with the winner. 
1. Entry Barriers and Other Barriers to Competition 
Schumpeter’s theory of economic development suggests that perfect competi-
tion would cripple entrepreneurial efforts for innovation and development and 
hinder long-term investments. Therefore most entrepreneurs use different 
methods – such as patents – to defend against competitive pressures. In auction 
markets of economic monopolies, potential bidders are screened by strict rules 
(e.g. capitalization, length of history in the sector), and the same is also true in 
political markets. Indeed, one of the characteristics of the market for incum-
bency, as well as for any natural monopolies, is that they set strong barriers to 
competition. We have already seen that the operating of government stands as 
an intra-sector (“within the field”) monopoly, so in this area there can be no 
competition at all. Whoever wins the license, gets an exclusive right for the 
term of the license agreement (in the case of the government this is usually 
four-to-five years, but in some sectors of the economy this is often decades) 
and becomes a monopolist (incumbent) in supplying the given public good, 
exempt from competition. The benefit is long-term stability, which means 
security for the long-term investments of the economic/political entrepreneur, 
but also stability for the consumer/citizen expectations. There is competition 
only beforehand, for the position of incumbent or for the license to operate a 
public good (“for the field”), so that competition only takes place periodically; 
even then it is limited. 
The most important barriers are the difficulties of entering the competition, 
the so called entry barriers. The first such barrier is the length of the incum-
bency, that is, the periodical nature of elections, which makes competition 
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possible only at the expiration of the license (mandate) to govern. A second 
barrier consists of various (legal or political) thresholds created by the electoral 
system, whereby entering the competition is not an automatic right and depends 
on the fulfilling of certain criteria. Electoral systems weigh votes differently 
(by applying mathematical formula) when awarding parliamentary seats. A 
third barrier involves strategic steps (e.g. policy or institutional reform) taken 
by incumbents to defend their political investments in certain policy areas from 
change beyond the term of the license. Such an amendment-barrier may be 
made possible by political tactics (party collusion) or by changing of the rules 
of the game (e.g. the constitution, the electoral system). Political investors can 
use these devices to defend their monopolistic position in place of the legal 
instruments, such as patents, that are available for economic entrepreneurs. 
Wohlgemuth (2000, 291-92) emphasizes the trade-offs in politics between 
open competitiveness and the barriers to competition. On the one hand, barriers 
to competition play an important role in a democracy in that they enhance the 
stability of political expectations, and by this, they (a) enhance the incumbent’s 
ability for long-term planning; (b) make it possible for the incumbent to carry 
the risk of reforms that are beneficial for the unorganized majority in the long-
term, but are against the short-term interest of a small, but organized minority; 
and (c) increase the stability of the expectations of citizens and foreigners, 
which contributes to their willingness to invest in the economy in the long-
term. On the other hand, open competition and contestability also have their 
advantages. First, they increase the motivation of the incumbent to adapt to 
changing citizens’ preferences (responsivity); second, they increase the chances 
of getting rid of an incumbent unable to fulfil its past promises (accountability); 
and third, they provide incentives for political entrepreneurs outside govern-
ment to enter political competition by exploring “new combinations” (innova-
tion). Following Schumpeter’s insights, we can say that perfect competition 
and pure monopoly are harmful in both the economy and in politics. However, 
there is no general, golden rule as to the desirable combination of the two. 
2. Award Criteria  
As opposed to auction markets of simple products and services, government 
deals with a political public good. Due to the intricacy and complexity of gov-
erning and to the existence of future contingencies, the winning bid cannot be 
selected by applying the principle of “the cheaper, the better”. The ordinary 
franchise-bidding analogy also falters here because voters do not have a prede-
termined, unified and closed set of criteria by which to judge the bids. Fur-
thermore, the bids themselves do not conform to any given pattern, so that they 
are often hardly comparable. 
For democratic elections to function properly as auctions, voters would need 
to set up clearly defined “price-quality packages” embracing the complexity of 
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government as evaluation criteria. This would only be possible if competitors 
were bidding only for a handful of public services predetermined by the voters. 
However – contrary to the presuppositions of the median voter model – there is 
no pre-defined political issue-space in elections.9 Parties and/or candidates 
come forward with a complex package of propositions and with promises that 
are not limited to a predetermined range of political issues. It is precisely in the 
nature of Schumpeterian political entrepreneurs to come up with differing 
propositions, with new and innovative ways of solving problems, while shaping 
the evaluation criteria themselves and influencing or manipulating public opin-
ion (see Körösényi 2010). 
In Schumpeter’s realistic world, voters do not set the agenda by defining 
what political services bidders have to offer, and they do not then select the 
“cheapest” bid. Rather, in this realistic world, political entrepreneurs set the 
agenda with their offers and voters can express their preferences only within 
this agenda, and within the accompanied – often quite vague – policy options 
(Wohlgemuth 2000, 278-79). As a consequence, in the world of monopolistic 
competition, the notion of “award criteria” loses its objective basis.10  
3. Incomplete Contract  
Election promises cannot be easily operationalized. Moreover, they are not 
legally binding. Thus, according to Williamson (1976 – cited by Wohlgemuth 
2000, 278-279), in politics we can speak of contractual disabilities. One of 
these is the complexity of the incumbent function and the uncertainty of future 
conditions. In terms of the principal-agent model, the obligations of the agent 
cannot be fully specified in the contract, which inevitably leaves a lot of entre-
preneurial freedom for the incumbent. Another contractual deficiency is that 
the contract between the principal and the agent is not only incomplete, or 
implicit, but practically non-existent. Elections are a special kind of auction 
where there is a one-sided authorization and no proper contract between the 
parties. As Schumpeter noted, at elections voters accept leadership and give 
their consent to be governed. Voters “decide” who will govern not by their own 
volition, but by their acceptance of leaders (1987, 270-3). The agents winning 
the incumbency have a relatively free hand (an unspecified mandate). Their 
freedom involves implementing political innovations that the principal had 
never thought of, and of which they would probably never have approved 
(Wohlgemuth 2000, 279). A further deficiency is that the agents’ freedom is 
                                                             
9  For more on the reasons of this, see the changing calculus model (Körösényi 2010), based 
on Riker’s (1983; 1986) heresthetics, Budge and Farlie’s (1983) salience theory and Stokes’ 
(2001) mandate theory. 
10  Like reelection criteria, which – due to lack of information and future uncertainty – become 
undeterminable in accountability-theory (Manin et al. 1999), and lose their objective basis 
in the changing calculus model (Körösényi 2010). 
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further increased by not having their activity controlled by any kind of supervi-
sor or license authority. The constitution, constitutional rules and conventions, 
which could be interpreted as controls, do not constitute a “final guardian” over 
incumbent political entrepreneurs, because the “self-regulatory” nature of poli-
tics makes it possible for the players to change the rules of the game (Wohlge-
muth 2000, 279-80). As a consequence of these contractual disabilities, the 
notions of the principal-agent relation and contract can only be used as vague 
metaphors and can hardly be viewed as good analogies for describing the pre-
cise nature of the voter-incumbent relationship. 
A Normative Implication: “agency loss” 
The three limitations described above – barriers to competition, the evaporation 
of award criteria, and contractual disabilities – have serious normative conse-
quences. One of them is that while the notion of “agency loss” can be applied 
in the median voter model (and can be viewed as a synonym for a breach of 
mandate), in monopolistic competition it can be used only in a limited sense. In 
a world that corresponds to the conditions of the median voter theory, market 
contracts are appropriately described by the principal-agent (P-A) model. Vot-
ers’ interests are determined by the position of the median voter, which makes 
the mandate of the agent clearly defined, and the authorization of the agent 
constitutes a bounded mandate to perform a task according to the instructions 
of the principal. Accordingly, “agency loss” is clear and easily defined: it 
means the breaching of the contract and a violation of the principal’s instruc-
tions by the agent. Examples of such violations include the agent taking advan-
tage of the situation at the principal’s expense, or failing to perform a task out 
of negligence. 
In the model of Schumpeterian monopolistic competition, however, “agency 
loss” cannot be applied in its original sense, as set out earlier. Public interest is 
not a given, defined by contract. Rather, it involves establishing and proposing 
certain political objectives, and is a matter of constant interpretation and re-
interpretation with its very definition being permanently contested by means of 
political innovation, including political advertising and manipulation. All this is 
bound up with the struggle for political support. The authorization of the win-
ners of the incumbency-license, that is the political agents, is hard to define, 
and can hardly be made specific. Their authorization is thus broad, vague, 
unbound, and general, meaning that elected politicians get a relatively free 
mandate. The agent-politician becomes a trustee, rather than a delegate or 
deputy. The notion of “agency loss” evaporates, and can be applied only in a 
limited sense as “breach of trust,” “misappropriation” or corruption. 
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Conclusions 
The application of the market analogy in the median voter and Public Choice 
models has constrained political theory. Indeed, markets are misleading as 
analogies and should be used only as vague metaphors. They are certainly not 
appropriate as bases for comprehensive models of democracy. To grasp the 
nature of political competition, we have to turn to a special type of “markets”, 
namely the auction markets of natural monopolies, as Tullock suggests. His 
specifications of Schumpeterian model of monopolistic competition, and its 
subsequent improvements by the new institutional economists, deliver several 
useful insights into the political process. 
In a democracy, the competition for government can be described as mo-
nopolistic competition, which involves limitations and entry barriers. Contrary 
to widely held opinions in the literature, such barriers have several benefits: 
they make it possible for the incumbent to set aside short-term considerations 
of vote maximization, and execute long-term political investments (reforms) 
that outlast electoral cycles. At the same time, though, strong barriers to com-
petition and a high threshold of entry can adversely affect selection of leaders 
and pose significant moral hazard. Moreover, the irrelevance of the meaning of 
“agency loss” indicates a decline of accountability – a serious potential prob-
lem in monopolistic competition. Thus, the auction-analogy affirms the 
Schumpeterian insight that competitive election of leaders does not mean giv-
ing a bounded mandate, as in the principal-agent model, but rather an accep-
tance of leaders (incumbents). Applying the principal-agent model to incum-
bency-licenses has also shown that license agreements are only vague 
metaphors. Political-electoral authorization means not delegation, but a free 
mandate for government. 
Tullock’s analysis of the auction markets and incumbency-licenses im-
proves our understanding of the nature of monopolistic competition and con-
firms a sceptical reading of Schumpeter’s theory of democracy. In themselves, 
elections do not constitute an effective method for holding rulers accountable, 
nor do they satisfy the requirements of Friedrich’s rule of anticipated effects. 
They are, however, in line with Przeworski’s (1999) minimalist notion of de-
mocracy, as well as with the authorization theory of representative democracy 
(Körösényi 2009). Open elections produce a broad authorization for governing, 
as well as making it possible to unseat incumbents who lose voter confidence. 
All this confirms Schumpeter’s (1987, 271) suspicion that monopolistic compe-
tition, which is unavoidable in a democracy, in the end may blur the thin line 
between procedural democracy and authoritarian government. 
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